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CSR-Contingent Executive Compensation Contracts

Abstract
Firms have increasingly started tying their executives’ compensation to CSR-related objectives. In
this paper, we attempt to understand why firms offer CSR-contingent compensation and the
conditions under which such compensation improves corporate social performance. Using handcollected data from proxy statements, we find that this emerging compensation practice varies
significantly across industries and across different CSR categories. Further, well-governed firms
are more likely to offer CSR-contingent compensation, and such compensation does lead to higher
corporate social standing. Such firms are more likely to offer formula-based, Objective CSRcontingent compensation. However, our results suggest that non-formulaic, Subjective CSRcontingent compensation also helps improve companies’ social performance when firm outcomes
are more volatile and unpredictable, and therefore executives’ effort and performance are harder
to evaluate, and when firms have better corporate governance.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility,
compensation, corporate governance
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executive

“…if multinational corporations are sincere about sustainability, then they must link
compensation for the senior executives directly to meeting goals such as cutting carbon
emissions, and lowering water and energy use. Otherwise those targets will always be
far down the list of executives’ priorities – if even on the list.”
Hugh Welsh, President of DSM North America1
1. Introduction
In recent times, many firms have started tying executive compensation to sustainability
metrics. Intel, for example, has been linking a portion of its executive and employee compensation
to corporate responsibility factors since 2008, and presently links 3% of all its employees’ annual
bonuses to environmental sustainability metrics. 2 Similarly, Alcoa links 20% of its executive
bonus plan to carbon dioxide reduction and other environmental and safety-related goals. Many
other firms, such as American Electric Power, Novo Nordisk and Xcel Energy, have instituted
similar initiatives (Harvard Business Review, 2015). Popular press and practitioners have praised
and advocated more widespread use of such CSR-contingent compensation contracts,3 arguing that
they can be more effective at increasing shareholder value compared to standard pay-forperformance initiatives that can induce myopic managerial decision-making by unduly prioritizing
short-term shareholder returns over long-term shareholder value (Kaplan and Norton, 1992;
Jensen, 2002; Lenssen, Bevan, and Fontrodona, 2010).
Several strands of literature can help explain why firms likely offer these CSR-contingent
compensation contracts to executives. For instance, the literature on the use of non-financial

1

The Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/aug/11/executive-compensation-bonusessustainability-goals-energy-water-carbon-dsm
2
Corporate Responsibility at Intel https://csrreportbuilder.intel.com/PDFfiles/CSR-2017_Full-Report.pdf
3
“… at the end of the day people are motivated by their pocketbooks … if you want companies to take (sustainability)
seriously, you are going to have to link it to people’s compensation.” By Veena Ramani, Senior Director of Corporate
Programs (CERES), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/why-tying-ceo-pay-sustainability-still-isnt-slam-dunk

3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3019985

metrics in executive compensation suggests that CSR-contingent compensation can constitute
optimal contracting under certain situations since they can provide information about managerial
effort beyond that captured by financial performance measures and can induce managers to focus
on long-term value creation (Holmstrom, 1979; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan, 1997). The institutional
theory of governance offers a slightly different perspective; it argues that firms take actions that
allow them to establish and enforce their social legitimacy (e.g. Bansal, 2005; Scott, 2008).
According to this view, by offering CSR-contingent compensation, firms are trying to cater to the
expectations that various financial and non-financial institutions have of firms regarding their
CSR-engagement. One indication of such increasing expectations is that over the last five years,
total assets in socially responsible mutual funds have grown by 59% to $72.6 billion. 4 Large
institutional investors (such as CalPERS) have also started investing more in socially responsible
firms (Guenster, Bauer, Derwall, and Koedijk, 2010), and that even credit rating agencies now use
firms’ CSR engagement to assess their credit-worthiness (Weber, Scholz, and Fenchel, 2010;
Attig, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Suh, 2013). In fact, to cope with these heightened institutional
expectations, more than 90 percent of the 250 largest companies in the world annually report on
their CSR initiatives, despite the increasingly rigorous reporting standards.5
Another likely reason for firms to offer CSR-contingent compensation could be that firms
are increasingly moving towards the stakeholder view of corporate governance (e.g. Freeman,
1984). Unlike the shareholder theory of corporate governance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama
and Jensen, 1983) which solely focuses on shareholder wealth maximization, the stakeholder

“Investors Follow Their Conscience” by Anna Prior http://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-follow-their-conscience1437154588, accessed January 22, 2016.
5
“CSR Reporting: The Expanding Field of Corporate Citizenship “by Rosalind McLymont https://tnj.com/csrreporting-the-expanding-field-of-corporate-citizenship/, accessed March 25, 2019.
4
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theory argues that executives act as agents for all stakeholders, including shareholders, customers,
employees, suppliers, etc. To the extent that self-interested managers have an interest in pursuing
their own agendas at the expense of this broad set of stakeholders, CSR-contingent compensation
can help align the interests of managers with those of the stakeholders (Jawahar and McLaughlin,
2001; Coombs and Gilley, 2005). The stakeholder theory of governance can be seen as an
‘enlightened’ version of the shareholder theory (e.g. Jensen, 2002) since it effectively argues that
corporations should pursue shareholder wealth with a long-run orientation that seeks sustainable
growth based on responsible attention to stakeholder interests. This approach contrasts with a
short-term focus on current share price even when that objective entails immediate or longer-term
negative effects on other stakeholders. The combination of a long-run, sustainable conception of
value coupled with acknowledgement of the importance of stakeholder considerations resonates
with notions of corporate social responsibility (Millon, 2011).
Shareholder, stakeholder and institutional theories of governance share one common
theme: all three suggest that at the end of the day, firms have increasingly started offering CSRcontingent compensation contracts in order to make a positive impact on corporate social standing
and hence firm value. This view is not shared by critics who argue that CSR-contingent
compensation creates the same perverse incentives that its pay-for-performance counterpart does.
A proponent of this view, who believes in the managerial power theory (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried,
2004), may argue that managers have a significant say in determining their own pay, especially
when boards are co-opted and board monitoring is weak (Wechsler-Linden and Lenzner, 1995).
Thus, it is no coincidence that more firms have started using CSR-contingent compensation
contracts recently as regular bonuses have come under increased scrutiny in the wake of the
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financial crisis (Kolk and Perego, 2014). 6 Relatedly, Ittner et al. (1997) suggest that one way
managers can increase their compensation (at the expense of shareholders/stakeholders) is by tying
it to the achievement of non-financial performance measures, including sustainability metrics, that
are potentially easy to manipulate and hard to verify.
In this paper, we primarily investigate whether granting executives CSR-contingent
compensation constitutes optimal contracting or an agency problem. To do this, we adopt a twopronged approach. First, we examine the variables that help explain the likelihood of firms
granting CSR-contingent compensation contracts and assess the extent to which they support some
of the implications that emerge from the different governance theories about what constitutes
optimal contracting. If the managerial power theory is true, then CSR contracts represent a
manifestation of agency cost at the expense of shareholders/stakeholders and we should expect
that firms’ tendency to grant these suboptimal contracts decreases with improvements in
governance. On the other hand, if CSR increases shareholder/stakeholder value, or if it helps a
firm establish/reinforce its social legitimacy, then better corporate governance and/or higher
product market competition should predict a higher likelihood of observing CSR-contingent
compensation contracts.
The other angle we adopt is that we focus on the firms that granted CSR-contingent
compensation contracts to their executives and examine the variables that help explain why some
firms in our sample offered subjective CSR-contingent compensation to their executives while
others offered objective CSR-contingent compensation. A strand of literature has examined the

A study by GMI Ratings indicates that at some firms as much as 40% of an executive’s annual bonus could be tied
to CSR goals. Xcel Energy, for instance, tied one-third of its CEO’s annual bonus to renewable energy and emission
reduction in 2013. http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/08/15/benefits-tying-executive-compensation-sustainability.
6
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circumstances under which subjective performance assessment can be more value-enhancing
compared to objective evaluation.7 For instance, in situations where performance is an imperfect
indicator of executives’ underlying effort, or where relevant information regarding performance
attainment cannot be entirely foreseen ex ante, subjective ex post evaluation of performance by the
principal can provide better incentives for the agent (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; Budde,
2007) and can even improve the efficiency of job assignments (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
There are different ways in which compensation contracts can be categorized as subjective
vs. objective. For the purposes of this study, we define a CSR-contingent contract as Objective if
the executive receiving the contract knows ex ante how much he/she can expect to earn from
pursuing pre-specified CSR-related activities. That is, an Objective CSR-contingent compensation
is ‘formulaic’ in that the contract specifies the weights attached to the accomplishment of specific
CSR-related activities. Conversely, we define a CSR-contingent contract as Subjective if the
executive receiving the contract is ex ante unaware of how much he/she can expect to earn. That
is, the percentage or amount of compensation is ex ante unknown to the executive and subject to
the discretion of the Compensation Committee ex post.
To conduct our tests, we comb through the annual proxy statements filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), of all companies that were part of the S&P 500 index
at the end of 2013, and carefully note whether any portion of the named executives’ pay at these
firms was tied to specific CSR-related objectives between 2009 and 2013. For firms that did
incentivize CSR-engagement in this fashion in any given year, we make note of the CSR-related
variables to which the firms tied executive compensation (e.g., safety, customer satisfaction,

7

Bol (2008) provides an excellent survey of this literature.
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diversity initiative, etc.). This allows us to examine intra- and inter-industry differences in firms
with respect to their CSR-contracting behavior. Additionally, we categorize each CSR contract as
Objective or Subjective, depending on whether the proxy statement clearly states the weights
assigned to each of the CSR-related activities expected of the executives.
Our empirical investigation suggests that CSR-contingent contracts are unlikely to be the
result of managerial power, i.e. likely do not represent a manifestation of agency costs. We find
that firms’ tendency to grant CSR-contingent compensation to executives varies considerably
across industries, and our results suggest that they usually contract on those CSR-related variables
that are likely to be more important (or subject to increased attention by market participants) in
their respective industries. For instance, firms in the Oil and Petroleum Products, Mining and
Minerals and Utilities industries had the highest percentage of firms that offer CSR-contingent
compensation contracts, and that most contracts in these industries are tied to milestones related
to Safety, Health and Environment (SHE) concerns that are more likely to exist in these industries.
We also find that after controlling for these industry effects, the likelihood of firms granting
CSR-contingent compensation increases with better governance and decreases with executive
power/entrenchment. For instance, our data suggest that independent boards are more likely to
offer CSR-contingent compensation, whereas firms with classified or co-opted boards are less
likely. Our results suggest that well-governed firms offer CSR-contingent compensation as a way
to mitigate agency problems and signal their commitment either to all stakeholders or to
shareholders. Additionally, we find that CSR ratings of firms increase after firms grant these
contracts, which suggests that CSR contracts do help accomplish what they set out to do, which is
to improve the firm’s corporate social standing (either as a means to an end to increase firm value

8
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for shareholders, or as an end in itself to cater to all stakeholders). All in all, these results cast
doubt on CSR-contingent contracts being the result of managerial power.
We further explore firms’ tendency to grant Subjective vs. Objective CSR-contingent
contracts. In particular, we find that roughly 2/3rds of the firms in our sample offered Subjective
CSR-contingent contracts to their executives; firms are more likely to offer Subjective contracts
when firm outcome is more volatile (e.g. volatility of earnings and stock returns) and is hence a
noisy measure of underlying performance. Relatedly, we find that firms are more likely to offer
Subjective CSR contracts when they have more growth opportunities, as measured by the firm’s
Tobin’s Q. In such firms with unpredictable outcomes, the boards should exhibit greater discretion
over how to compensate the executives according to their effort and performance. Thus, subjective
contracting could avoid managers being rewarded for pure luck. Finally, while both Objective and
Subjective CSR contracts result in improved subsequent CSR ratings for firms, Subjective CSR
contracts become effective only at firms whose outcomes are volatile and where corporate
governance is rather strong. This finding is consistent with Bol (2008) who argues that firms are
more likely to introduce subjectivity if the monitoring intensity of the board is high, i.e. when the
board is better able to monitor the executives and/or gather the requisite information to effectively
conduct a subjective performance evaluation.
We fill the gap in the relatively nascent literature that lies at the intersection of executive
compensation and corporate social responsibility (e.g. Hong, Li and Minor, 2016; Brooks and
Oikonomou, 2018). Most prior studies that have investigated how executive compensation
influences corporate social responsibility have examined how traditional measures of executive
pay, like base salary, stock ownership, total compensation etc. influence (or are influenced by) a
firm’s socially responsible behavior (Cai, Jo, and Pan, 2011; Francoeur, Melis, Gaia, and Aresu,
9
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2017; Karim, Lee, and Suh, 2018; Rekker et al., 2014; Jian and Lee, 2015). Ours is one of the first
studies to provide a direct panel-data analysis of CSR-contingent executive compensation
contracts to help understand whether offering CSR contracts to executives constitutes optimal
contracting or not. Moreover, since we analyze firms that compensate executives for pursuing
environment-friendly initiatives, our paper also adds to the relatively new research field of
“climate finance” (e.g. Baker, Bergstresset, Serafeim, and Wurgler, 2018; Painter, 2019; Karolyi,
2019).8 Specifically, our paper helps understand the role that executive compensation contracts
can play in helping reduce adverse climate change.
Perhaps more importantly, we conduct a thorough investigation of the potential valuerelevance of CSR contracts by not only attempting to understand their relevance in the context of
different theories of corporate governance, but also by exploring the circumstances under which
firms choose to offer Subjective vs. Objective CSR-contingent contracts. This mode of
investigation not only adds more rigor to our analysis, but also helps us better understand when
firms may optimally choose to evaluate their executives subjectively vs. objectively. In the
process, we also add to the growing body of literature looking to understand the efficacy of
subjective performance evaluation of executives (Bol, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, the
only other closely related paper in this respect is Maas (2018). Maas examines how corporate
social performance targets affect CSR outcomes. The difference is that they focus on hard CSR
targets vs. soft targets, while we study subjective and objective executive compensation and
incentive aspects of the CSR contracts, based on whether dollar amount or compensation
percentage are assigned in the contracts.

8

We are thankful to an anonymous referee for making this point.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature and
develop the hypotheses. Section 3 explains our data sample. Section 4 provides results and
discussion. Section 5 includes robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1. CSR-Contingent Compensation as Optimal Contracting
The literature offers several reasons why firms would want to grant CSR-contingent
compensation to its executives. The most straightforward way to understand why firms offer CSRcontingent compensation to their executives is via the lens of the stakeholder theory of governance.
According to this view, a firm must cater to the expectations of all its stakeholders since the firm’s
responsibility extends beyond mere economics or financial performance (e.g. Freeman, 1984,
2010; Freeman and Velamuri, 2006; Edmans, 2012), and that the fulfillment of these
responsibilities is important for long-run value creation. Related empirical evidence indicates, for
instance, that firms which focus on improving employee engagement (Flammer and Luo, 2017) or
try to cater to their customers by promoting a cleaner environment (Russo and Fouts, 1997) benefit
from a better social reputation and economic performance. In contrast, firms that engage in ecoharmful behavior suffer from reduced value due to customer boycotts and increased government
scrutiny (Harvard Business Review, 2015; Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014).
Another explanation emerges from the shareholder theory of corporate governance, which
argues that the objective behind any executive compensation structure (and more generally, any
corporate governance mechanism) should be to mitigate the agency problem arising from the
separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1980). By
tying executive pay to performance, firms can better align the incentives of managers to those of
11
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shareholders. The problem is that sometimes accounting or market performance indicators (like
stock price) can be imperfect or noisy measures of managers’ underlying efforts. In situations like
these, compensating managers for achieving specific CSR-related milestones can constitute
optimal contracting because including such performance measures in the portfolio of performance
measures can provide additional information about the managers’ actions (Holmstrom, 1979;
Banker and Datar, 1989) and can induce management to take actions that are more congruent with
shareholder wealth maximization (Feltham and Xie, 1994).
From the shareholder theory perspective, then, the reason firms compensate executives for
CSR-related milestones is that this constitutes ‘optimal contracting’ in response to agency
problems and to constraints that limit contracting entirely on financial performance measures
(usually with a short time horizon). Executives tend to boost short-term performance at the expense
of long-term value creation, because they usually face short-term pressure such as meeting analyst
quarterly earnings forecasts (Jensen and Fuller, 2002). 9 Therefore, myopic executives may not
want to engage in CSR initiatives which usually only pay off in the long term (Kotler, Hessekiel,
and Lee, 2012; Edmans, 2012). To shift focus to long-term value creation, firms should provide
proper incentives such as CSR-contingent contracts to their decision makers. Accordingly, if the
shareholder theory of governance holds true, we should expect firms’ tendency to grant CSRcontingent contracts to increase with better governance, such as increased board independence or
better corporate control.
From the perspective of the stakeholder theory of corporate governance, CSR-contingent
compensation contracts cater to the needs of all its stakeholders, particularly those that control

9

A survey by Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) report that 78% of managers favor boosting short-term earnings
at the expense of long-term performance.
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important resources and can have a significant impact on firm value (Deegan, 2009). In this
respect, the stakeholder theory of corporate governance is not too different from the shareholder
theory, because they both view CSR-contingent contracts as an ‘optimal’ way to induce managers
to take actions that can help improve firm value. The difference between the two approaches lies
on the ultimate goal of the CSR contracting: the shareholder theory argues that with shareholder
wealth maximization as the only goal, the CSR contracts mitigate the problems of information
asymmetry and managerial short-termism; the stakeholder theory believes that CSR and CSR
contracts must consider and create value for all stakeholders, with long-term shareholder wealth
maximization as a natural result of it. This also helps explain why researchers have attempted to
reconcile the two views by proposing a revised, “enlightened shareholder wealth maximization”
view of corporate governance (Jensen, 2002).
Whether the firm adopts a shareholder perspective or a stakeholder perspective of
governance, one should expect better corporate governance to increase the likelihood of firms
offering CSR-contingent contracts. Thus, we hypothesize as follows:
H1a: If the stakeholder or the shareholder theory is true, measures of better corporate
governance should positively predict the likelihood of firms offering CSR-contingent compensation
contracts.
Moreover, because the importance of specific stakeholders varies across industries, the
stakeholder theory of corporate governance would imply that, to the extent that firms have a greater
incentive to cater to more important stakeholders, firms in each industry will contract on different
CSR-contracting variables, depending on which variables are likely to be more important in their
respective industries:
13
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H2: If the stakeholder theory is true, CSR-related performance measures underpinning the
CSR contracts should vary across industries depending on the relative importance of concerned
stakeholders in the industry.
The above hypothesis implies, for instance, that we should expect to see firms in
environmentally sensitive industries (e.g. Mining, Oil and Petroleum) to contract on variables
relating to safety, health and environment. Because health and safety concerns of employees in
these industries are likely to be more salient, we hypothesize:
H3a: Firms in environmentally sensitive industries are more likely to offer CSR-contingent
contracts to their executives, as implied by the stakeholder theory and the institutional theory.
Finally, one additional theory of governance that can help explain the existence of CSR
contracts is the institutional theory. The theory posits that firms operate within a social framework
of norms, values and taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or
acceptable economic behavior (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). Thus, firms stand to gain legitimacy
by conforming to these expectations of institutions and stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Bansal, 2005; Scott, 2008).
This, in turn, can have several advantages, including reducing the probability of organizational
failure (Scott, 1995), improving exchange conditions with partners and access to resources
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), allowing firms to innovate with lower exposure to risk of loss
(Sherer and Lee, 2002), lowering cost of capital (Bansal and Clelland, 2004), and improving
financial performance (King and Lenox, 2002). To the extent that firms are increasingly expected
to engage in CSR-related activities, one can see CSR-contingent executive compensation as a way
firms help establish or reinforce their social legitimacy (Deegan, 2009; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia,
14
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2009). The pressure to offer CSR-contingent compensation can also arise as organizations try to
emulate other firms’ doing the same so as to gain a competitive advantage in terms of legitimacy
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Unerman and Bennett, 2004).
To the extent that catering to institutional expectations and establishing/reinforcing the
firm’s legitimacy can result in a higher firm value, we expect better governance to positively
predict the likelihood of firms offering CSR-contingent compensation contracts. This is the same
hypothesis we made with shareholder and stakeholder theories of corporate governance.
In contrast to all the above governance theories, which in one way or another make a case
for why firms use CSR-contingent compensation as a way of optimal contracting, the managerial
power theory argues that these contracts represent a manifestation of agency costs. (e.g., Bebchuk,
Fried, and Walker, 2002; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999). When managers have excessive
power, become entrenched, or co-opt members on the board of directors, they can exert greater
influence over how they are compensated, leading to undue overcompensation (Wechsler-Linden
and Lenzner, 1995; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). By setting loosely defined contract terms, or easyto-reach CSR goals, executives can attain higher bonuses through CSR-contingent compensation
than they otherwise could (Ittner et al., 1997; Kolk and Perego, 2014). Thus, it is no coincidence
(according to this view) that more firms have started using CSR-contingent compensation recently
as regular bonuses have come under increased scrutiny by market participants in the wake of the
financial crisis (Kolk and Perego, 2014). Assessing CSR-related accomplishments sometimes
requires considerable subjective judgment, and even when they are objectively measurable,
managers who have captured the board can potentially set easy-to-achieve measurable targets just
to boost their compensation (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Courty and Marschke, 2004).

15
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If CSR contracts, as a manifestation of agency problems, provide an opportunity for
managers to manipulate their compensation, firms’ tendency to grant CSR-contingent contracts
should decrease in measures of good governance. Conversely, we should expect firms to offer
more CSR-contingent contracts as the quality of governance declines. Thus, we hypothesize:
H1b: If the managerial power theory is true, then measures of better corporate governance
should negatively predict the likelihood of firms offering CSR-contingent compensation contracts.
Moreover, because such CSR contracts would be self-serving rather than driven by
fundamentals, the theory does not make any specific predictions about which industries we should
expect to see firms contract on CSR the most, or about which CSR-related activities firms should
contract on. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3b: If the managerial power theory is true, then we should not observe meaningful interindustry differences, neither in terms of percentage of firms that offer CSR-contracts in each
industry nor in terms of the CSR-variables that firms contract on.
The managerial power theory contrasts with all other governance perspectives in terms of
its predictions about the factors that determine a firm’s motivation to offer CSR-contingent
contracts. Since CSR contracts are self-serving under the managerial power theory perspective,
there is no real reason why one should expect such CSR contracts to have a significantly positive
impact on a firm’s corporate social standing in subsequent years. After all, if CSR-milestones set
in these contracts are deliberately set at low/easily attainable levels, or are hard to measure, then
there is no reason to expect any meaningful CSR-related accomplishment. In contrast, if any of
the other governance theories are true, then one should expect CSR-contingent contracts to provide
16
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proper incentives for managers to focus on CSR initiatives. Therefore, the contracts should have a
positive impact on a firm’s corporate social standing in subsequent years. This leads to our next
set of hypotheses:
H4a: If either the shareholder theory, or the stakeholder theory, or the institutional theory
of governance is true, then one should expect CSR-contingent contracts to have a positive impact
on a firm’s corporate social standing in subsequent years.
H4b: If the managerial power theory is true, then one should not expect CSR-contingent
contracts to have any significant impact on a firm’s corporate social standing in subsequent years.
2.2. Subjective vs. Objective CSR-Contingent Contracts
Granting a CSR-contingent compensation contract to executives is one thing; whether such
attainment is measured objectively or subjectively is quite another. The literature has examined
the issue of whether executive compensation should be contracted objectively or subjectively. One
way to introduce discretion in compensation contracts is to allow the ex post performance
evaluation to be subjective, either by using subjective performance measures, by allowing for (ex
post) flexibility in the weighting of objective performance measures, or by allowing for (ex post)
discretional adjustments based on factors other than the performance measures specified ex ante
(Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus, 2004; Bol, 2008).10 We focus on subjectivity in
weights, dollar amount or compensation percentage linked to the target, because this allows us to
look at the monetary incentive that executives receive. While collecting data on the CSR contracts,
we find this subjectivity in weights often overlaps with the subjectivity in performance measures.

10

These forms of ex post performance assessment are not mutually exclusive; compensation contracts often include
a combination of these forms of subjectivity.
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Regardless of how subjectivity is introduced into CSR contracting, there are several
reasons why introducing such subjectivity can be optimal. For instance, subjectivity can improve
incentive contracting because it allows value-enhancing efforts that are not easily quantified to be
included (e.g. Baker et al., 1994; Budde, 2007). This subjectivity is likely to be more useful in
mitigating such incentive distortions when available objective performance measures are noisy or
imperfect (Murphy and Oyer, 2003; Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora, 2006; Höppe and Moers,
2008). Subjectivity is also valuable in mitigating manager’s risk because it allows the principal to
incorporate new information that becomes available during the contract period to evaluate the
manager (Bol, 2008). Additionally, Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith (1996) and Gibbs et al.,
(2004) show that use of subjectivity to assess performance can be particularly useful in situations
when the principal’s objective is to encourage the agent to take a long-run view of the firm. Murphy
and Oyer (2003), in particular, argue that firms with strong growth or greater investment
opportunities should make more use of subjective performance assessment, since in these firms it
is important for managers to focus on more long-run value creation. If any of the governance
theories outlined above are true, i.e. CSR-contingent contracts constitute optimal contracting, then
one would expect firms to be more inclined to offer Subjective CSR-contingent contracts compared
to Objective ones if they have more growth opportunities. The same relationship should be true
with respect to earnings volatility, since the more volatile the earnings, the less informative they
are of underlying effort and hence the more room for subjective assessment. Accordingly, we
hypothesize the following:
H5: The likelihood of firms offering Objective CSR contracts to executives should be (a)
decreasing in firms’ investment opportunities, and (b) decreasing in volatility of firm outcomes.
18
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While introducing subjectivity in CSR-contingent contracts can be useful in certain
situations, it can also be costly. Perhaps the biggest concern with subjective performance contracts
is that these contracts are not enforceable in the court of law, which means that the board can assess
executive performance untruthfully (Bol, 2008). The greater the expectation (by executives) that
the board will evaluate them untruthfully, the more likely it is that introducing subjectivity in
performance assessment will distort incentives and reduce firm value (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002).
Collusion between board and management, in situations where the board is co-opted or composed
of many inside executives, can make subjective contracts ineffective. This problem is also likely
to get inflated if the board’s information gathering costs are rather high. Höppe and Moers (2008)
show that information gathering costs negatively affect the introduction of subjectivity. They
provide empirical evidence indicating that companies that could benefit from discretion are less
likely to introduce subjectivity if the monitoring intensity of the board is low.
That said, we expect the usefulness of subjective contracts to increase if firms have better
governance. For example, board independence can remedy the above-stated impediments to the
effectiveness of subjective CSR contracts. First, independent board members are likely to be
concerned about their reputation as truthful performance evaluators, since they usually serve on
multiple boards. Consequently, they are much less likely to renege on subjective contracts than
insider directors (Carmichael, 1989). Secondly, a plethora of literature shows that independent
boards are better monitors of firms than non-independent boards and are less likely to collude.
This again implies that such board members will be more effective at implementing optimal
Subjective CSR-contingent contracts. Thus, we hypothesize as follows:
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H6: Subjective CSR contracts should become more effective in improving firms’ CSR
rating when firm outcomes are more volatile and firms have better governance.
3. Data and Variable Description
We identify S&P 500 companies at the end of December 2013 and examine their Proxy
Statements filed to U.S. SEC for the fiscal years 2009–2013. In carefully going through these
statements, we note whether any portion of executives’ compensation was tied to “safety”,
“environment”, “customer satisfaction”, “social responsibility”, and/or other variables related to
corporate social responsibility. 11 Specifically, in the spirit of Maas (2018), we search for the
following keywords:
•

Community (to capture phrases like community development, community engagement)

•

Ethic (like ethical standards, ethics training)

•

Corporate (like corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship)

•

Satisfaction (like customer satisfaction, client satisfaction, employee satisfaction)

•

Environment (like environmental compliance, environmental goals)

•

Sustainability (like sustainable, sustainability)

•

Performance (like individual performance, performance measures, performance metrics)

•

Engage (like employee engagement, engage employees, community engagement)

•

Safety

•

Health

•

Injury

•

Accident

•

Diverse/Diversity

11

Prior literature (e.g. Ittner et al., 1997) has examined the existence of compensation contracts tied, more broadly, to
non-financial measures. Our focus is specifically on compensation tied to CSR-related variables, which are a subset
of non-financial measures. Thus, we do not consider any compensation that is tied to variables like “market share”,
“leadership and vision”, “succession planning”, integration of acquired operations, etc., which are non-financial
measures but not CSR measures.
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•

Qualitative (to see if there are any other CSR-related variables that firms specifically

mention as one of the qualitative measures that link to executive compensation)
•

Non-financial/nonfinancial (to see if there are any other CSR-related variables that firms

specifically mention as one of the non-financial measures that link to executive compensation)
In most cases, searching for all these words give us a fairly good idea about how, if at all,
the firm pays its executives for achieving CSR-related milestones.12 We subsequently differentiate
between executives who receive CSR-contingent compensation and those who do not by using a
dummy variable CSR_contract, which takes a value of 1 if the proxy statement indicates that the
executive’s pay was tied to achievement of CSR-related milestones, 0 otherwise. For the CSR
contracts, we make note of the underlying CSR variables to which executive compensation is tied.
We operationalize this perspective by first putting all of our CSR-related variables into six broad
buckets:
(a)

Safety, Health and Environment: Safety, health, environment

(b)

Customer Satisfaction: Customer/client Satisfaction

(c)

Employee Satisfaction: Employee satisfaction/engagement

(d)

Diversity

(e)

Corporate Citizenship/Responsibility & Sustainability

(f)

Ethics/Corporate Culture

We introduce these six broad categories in order to create six dummy variables
respectively: SHE_D, CSAT_D, ESAT_D, Diversity_D, Sust_D, and Ethics_D.
Finally, for each CSR contract, we introduce an additional dummy variable
Objective_contract, which takes a value of 1 if the contract provides a formulaic relationship

Sometimes we find firms using phrases like “client relationships”, “employee well-being”, etc. While these do not
appear in our list directly, searching for our words does eventually lead us to the specific sections in the Proxy
Statements where firms provide details about executive compensation tied to these measures. We then read the sections
thoroughly. In this sense, our list of search words is fairly comprehensive.
12
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between CSR and executive compensation, i.e. if the compensation contract is Objective.
Conversely, this dummy variable takes a value of 0 if the contract does not provide a formulaic
relationship between CSR and executive compensation, i.e. if the CSR contract is Subjective.13
Appendix 2 shows excerpts from Objective and Subjective CSR-contingent compensation
contracts across the six broad CSR categories identified in this paper.
Data on firm-level variables (assets, leverage, etc.) comes from COMPUSTAT. Data on
stock returns come from CRSP and data on executive compensation is obtained from
EXECUCOMP. Ownership structure data is from CapitalIQ. Board information is from ISS. We
also secure data on firms’ social performance scores from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD),
a third-party data vendor that provides CSR ratings for publicly traded firms. We use data from
these sources primarily to identify control/explanatory variables in our regressions. Where
applicable, we classify firms into industries based on the Fama-French’s 17 Industry Classification
(obtained from Fama and French’s website).14
We collect data on many commonly used variables that have been shown to be important
in determining CSR and compensation contracting. These variables fall into three categories: firm
fundamentals (firm size, firm risk, Tobin’s Q, ROA, Leverage, Earnings volatility, Credit rating,
CSR rating, Life cycle stage), corporate governance measures (Board independence, Board size,
Board diversity, Classified board, Board cooption, CEO Duality, Analyst coverage, Industry
competition, Institutional ownership, Institutional ownership concentration), and executive
13

Sometimes firms clearly specify that they deliberately offer a Subjective contract. For instance, Air Products &
Chemicals Inc.’s 2011 Proxy Statement states that “… the Company does not apply a formula or use a pre-determined
weighting when comparing overall performance against the various objectives and no single objective is material in
determining individual performance…variables that the Committee consider… safety, sustainability, diversity, and
continuous improvement.”
14
We also used Fama-French 30 and Fama-French 48 Industry classification for robustness, and the economic
significance of our estimates remained qualitatively unchanged. Since our sample size is relatively small, we chose
to use Fama-French 17 Industry Classification for our analysis.
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characteristics (Age, Gender, CEO title, CEO tenure, board membership, Total compensation,
Share ownership%, Tenure). In addition to many readily usable variables, we also construct some
more complicated measures, such as board diversity index and firm life cycle stage, to better and
more comprehensively reflect the environment around the CSR contracting. In particular, a
diversified board likely reflects more stakeholder representation on boards (Luoma and Goodstein,
1999) as well as better board governance due to better information and stronger scrutiny from
different perspectives of the board members (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 2003; Bernile,
Bhagwat, and Yonker, 2018). Firms in different life cycle stages have different resources and
limitations that may affect firms’ CSR investments and performance (Withisuphakorn and
Jiraporn, 2016). We provide all the definitions of these variables in Appendix 1.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Table 1 shows how our sample firms are distributed across Fama-French 17 industries and
across years. Specifically, it shows the number and percentage of firms in each industry that
offered CSR-contingent compensation to at least one of their executives. We separately report
these numbers and percentages for each of our sample years. The results indicate that more than
40% of the S&P 500 firms tied executive compensation to CSR variables in each sample year. We
also see a mild upward trend in CSR contracting, with the percentage of firms rising monotonically
from 42.48% in 2009 to 47.61% in 2013.
Table 1 also suggests that industry membership is an important determinant of whether a
firm offers CSR contracts. For instance, 100% of the firms in the Mining and Minerals industry
offered CSR-contingent compensation to their executives in every sample year. This percentage
was rather high in Oil and Petroleum Products (77% - 91%) and Utilities (88% - 91%) industries
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as well. In contrast, less than 15% of the firms in the Textile Apparel & Footwear industry offered
such contracts. Notably, Mining and Minerals, Oil and Petroleum Products, and Utilities are all
heavily regulated industries due to the high levels of pollution, natural resource depletion, and
other adverse environmental consequences they create for society. Firms in these industries are
more likely to be scrutinized by shareholders, regulators, and other stakeholders for lack of
engagement in CSR. The finding that firms in these industries have a greater tendency to offer
CSR contracts suggests that firms believe that tying executive compensation to CSR variables,
particularly those related to Safety and Environment, is the right way of incentivizing executives.
To better understand how industry membership likely influences firms’ tendency to offer
CSR contracts, we further examine the use of different CSR-contracting variables, specifically,
how many firms (number and percentage) in each industry contract on the six CSR categories.
Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive, i.e. firms could (and mostly do) contract on
several CSR-related variables at the same time. We expect that firms in Mining and Minerals, Oil
and Petroleum Products, and Utilities industries would exhibit greater use of CSR variables related
to “Safety” or “Environment” due to the regulated nature of their business.
Table 2 reports the results of this exercise and confirms our priors. Among the six
categories, firms mostly contract on Safety, Health and Environment concerns (approximately
50% of the firms in each year), and firms in Mining and Minerals, Oil and Petroleum Products,
and Utilities industries all had more than 90% of the firms contracting on these CSR-variables.
Customer Satisfaction is the other popular CSR metric, with almost 40% of our sample firms
contracting on some measure of customer/client satisfaction. Supporting our Hypothesis 2 that
industry membership is an important determinant of the choice of CSR-contracting variables,
Customer Satisfaction is more commonly contracted upon in Retail industry; none of the firms in
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Mining and Minerals, Oil and Petroleum Products industry contracted on customer/client
satisfaction in our sample. Similarly, Ethical Conduct and Corporate Culture was mostly
contracted upon in the Financial industry, which is hardly surprising considering that our sample
period of 2009 – 2013 immediately follows the financial crisis of 2008. Overall, our findings seem
consistent with Ittner et al. (1997) who find that industry membership is an important determinant
of the likelihood of firms offering executive compensation related to the achievement of nonfinancial measures. The results are also consistent with Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) who
find that firms in regulated industries tie executive pay to environmental performance.
In Table 3 we examine the number and percentage of firms that offered an Objective CSR
contract compared to a Subjective one. We limit our analysis here to firms that offered a CSR
contract to at least one of their executives. As in Table 1, we look at the distribution of these
contracts across Fama-French 17 industries in each sample year. Table 3 shows that, on average,
roughly one-third of the CSR contracts offered by S&P 500 firms between 2009 and 2013 were
Objective. Firms in Oil and Petroleum Products and Utilities industries depict the highest
percentage of Objective CSR contracts, approximately 50% and 65% respectively across the
sample years.15 Thus, our results seem to suggest that industry membership not only influences the
likelihood of firms offering a CSR contract but also the nature (objective vs. subjective) of the
underlying CSR contract.
Oil and Petroleum Products and Utilities are 2 of the same 3 industries which, according
to Table 1, also had the highest percentage of firms that offered CSR contracts in the first place.
One possible explanation is that CSR-related concerns of firms in these industries are relatively

15

Table 3 shows that 100% of the firms in Textile Apparel & Footwear and Steel Works industries offer Objective
CSR contracts. However, there are less than 5 firms in these industries. For that reason, we mainly focus on Oil and
Petroleum Products and Utilities industries for the purpose of this discussion.
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more easily measurable compared to firms in other industries, thereby making it easier for firms
to write Objective contracts. For instance, to the extent that firms in Oil and Petroleum Products
and Utilities industries care more about “Safety” or “Environment” (as Table 2 does suggest), it
might be easier for them to write contracts that clearly specify targets related to, say, Co2 or
greenhouse gas emissions, energy consumption, etc. and then assign a specific dollar amount or
percentage of executive compensation. In contrast, firms that value “ethical conduct” or
“diversity” may not be able to write such Objective contracts because it is hard to set specific CSR
and compensation targets related to these measures.16 Thus, it is not industry membership, per se,
but the relative measurability of the CSR variable(s) important to firms in those industries that
determines whether the executives receive an Objective or a Subjective CSR contract.
While this may be a plausible explanation for our results, we believe that it likely does not
tell the entire story behind why firms choose to offer Objective vs. Subjective contracts. First, in
Table 1 we identified Mining and Minerals as one of the industries that had the highest percentage
(100% in fact!) of CSR-contracting firms in each sample year. Environmental, safety, and
regulatory concerns are likely to be as relevant in this industry as they are in Oil and Petroleum
Products and Utilities. Yet, in Table 3, we find that between 2009 and 2012, only 20%-25% of
firms in the Mining and Minerals industry offered an Objective CSR contract.17
Second, the way we define Objective and Subjective CSR contracts is more in terms of
whether it establishes a formulaic relationship between executive compensation and executives’
CSR-related accomplishments. Thus, a CSR contract that explicitly ties 10% of executives’ bonus

16

We are grateful to one anonymous referee for making this point in an earlier version of this paper.
The number of observations is small (only 5 firms) compared to Oil and Petroleum Products and Utilities; perhaps
the comparison is not fair.
17
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to, say, diversity-related accomplishments classifies as an Objective contract. Whether or not the
firm concurrently states the specific diversity milestone that needs to be achieved in order to get
that 10% does not influence our classification.18 For the same reason, we classify a CSR contract
as Subjective if the firm does not specify the exact compensation that the executive will receive
related to, say, reducing Co2 emissions, but does state that a portion of executives’ compensation
is tied to reducing Co2 emissions by a specific amount. Here the target CSR-milestone is
measurable but the portion of executive compensation is not.
Third, our reading of sample firms’ Proxy Statements suggests that almost all CSR-related
variables are measurable (albeit some more than others). For instance, in its 2011 Proxy Statement,
Pepco Holdings Inc. states that it ties 10% of executive compensation to diversity initiatives “…
as measured by the attainment of … established affirmative action goals.” 19 Elsewhere in the
document, the firm mentions that it measures attainment of diversity goals by looking at factors
such as “…presenting at and attending Company- or subsidiary-sponsored diversity events, and
expenditures made to minority-owned businesses.” In these cases, diversity-related
accomplishments are being explicitly measured. Similarly, CSR variables like promoting an
ethical culture can be measured as well; for instance, the 2011 Proxy Statement of CA
Technologies, Inc., states that “… executive compensation is also tied to the ethical standards of
the Company. A failure to complete annual ethics training results in a mandatory 10% reduction
of an executive’s annual performance cash incentive.”20 The point is that in all these cases, the

For example, in its 2011 Proxy Statement, Automatic Data Processing assigned 5% of the bonus to “… Actively
engag(ing) in diversity strategies and continu(ing) improving the representation of female and minority executives.”
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/8670/000120677412004138/adp_def14a.htm
19
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1135971/000119312512137709/d317477ddef14a.htm
20
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/356028/000095012311058367/y91589def14a.htm
18
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underlying CSR variables are, to some extent, measurable. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that
the measurability of the underlying CSR variable begets the nature of the CSR contract.
That said, our reading of firms’ proxy statements does suggest at least some overlap
between the measurability of underlying CSR variables and the nature of executive compensation
offered to executives. Generally, but not always, firms seem more inclined to offer an Objective
CSR contract if the underlying CSR contract variables are relatively more measurable. To shed
additional light on this issue, we examine the number and percentage of firms that offered an
Objective or a Subjective CSR contract conditional on (one of the six broad) underlying CSRcontracting variables.
The results of this exercise in Table 4 confirm our suspicion that the relative measurability
of the underlying CSR-contracting variable possibly plays some role in explaining why firms offer
Objective CSR contracts. For instance, the total number of firms contracted on Safety, Health and
Environment, roughly 50% offered an Objective contract. In contrast, of the total number of firms
that contracted on Ethics, less than 30% offered an Objective CSR contract. To the extent that
Safety, Health and Environmental targets are easier to establish and measure as compared to those
related to Ethics, these results suggest that the measurability of the underlying CSR variable is an
important determinant of whether firms offer Objective vs. Subjective CSR-contingent contracts.
Nonetheless, we also observe that this is likely not the complete story: even if we argue that Safety,
Health and Environment targets are more easily measurable, Table 4 suggests that roughly 50% of
the firms that contracted on Safety, Health and Environment offered a Subjective (non-formulaic)
contract to their executives. Similarly, while Customer/Client satisfaction is relatively easy to
measure (using customer surveys, for instance), about 60% of the firms that contracted on some
measure of Customer/Client satisfaction offered a Subjective contract.
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Overall, our results from Tables 1-4 indicate that while industry membership and relative
measurability of underlying CSR variables play an important part in influencing the likelihood of
firms offering a CSR contract as well as the nature of the CSR contract, there are likely other
factors that help explain the observed inter-industry and intra-industry heterogeneity among firms.
To reflect on these other potential determinants, we turn our attention to other firm-level
differences between firms that contracted on CSR and those that did not, and between firms that
offered Subjective contracts and those with Objective contracts. Table 5 Panel A shows summary
statistics of these firm-level differences. Column 1 of Panel A shows that, on average, firms that
offered CSR-contingent contracts are larger, less risky, have lower Tobin’s Q, ROA, leverage, and
have a higher credit rating and CSR rating. In terms of corporate governance, CSR contracting
firms are more likely to have independent boards, larger boards, CEO duality structure, more
analyst coverage, more industry competition and less institutional ownership. They are less likely
to have classified boards and co-opted boards. In particular, analyst coverage and industry
competition are considered effective external governance mechanisms (Chen, Harford, and Lin,
2015; Giroud and Mueller, 2011), while CEO duality (CEO also serving as board chairman),
classified board (board with staggered election), and co-opted board (the proportion of board
members appointed after the CEO assumes office) suggest weak governance structures where the
CEOs can capture the boards more easily (Jensen, 1993; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Coles, Daniel,
and Naveen, 2014). See all variable definitions in Appendix 1.
In Column 2, we explore the difference between firms that offered Objective contracts to
their executives, and those that offered Subjective CSR contracts. 21 On average, firms with

21

Note that a rare case is that a firm offers Subjective contracts to some executives and objective contracts to others
at the same time. If this is the case, we include the firm in both categories.
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Objective CSR contracts tend to have low ROA, high leverage, low Q-ratios, high credit rating
and low CSR rating, and be less mature, compared to firms that offer Subjective CSR contracts.
For corporate governance measures, firms with Objective CSR contracts have smaller and more
independent boards, less CEO duality, less analyst coverage, more industry competition, less
institutional ownership and higher ownership concentration.
In sum, firms with Objective contracts are significantly different from those with Subjective
contracts, just as firms with CSR contracts are so different from those without.
The correlations in Table 5 Panel B suggest that CSR-contracting firms are generally
larger, less risky, have lower Q and ROA, and have higher leverage, credit rating, CSR rating, and
board independence. While results in Table 5 are helpful in preliminarily identifying important
firm-level differences between our sample firms, it is hard to draw any meaningful conclusions
based on these findings due to their univariate nature. For instance, both panels in Table 5 show
that firms that contract on CSR are, on average, larger, i.e. have significantly more net assets. At
the same time, however, Table 1 and Table 2 show that CSR contracts (as well Objective CSR
contracts) are more pervasive in industries like Utilities, Mining and Minerals, which tend to be
very capital intensive. Thus, the large size of CSR-contracting firms could simply be capturing the
effect of industry membership on CSR contracting. Therefore, we subsequently conduct
multivariate analysis, by controlling for industry fixed effects, to isolate the impact of correlated
variables on firms’ tendency to award CSR contracts.
4.2. Multivariate Analysis
4.2.1. The Determinants
In Table 6, we report the results from running various logistic regressions at the firm level
in which the dependent variable is CSR_contract, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if
30
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the firm offered CSR-contingent compensation contract to at least one of its executives, and 0
otherwise. Based on our Table 1 results, we include industry fixed effects in all our regression
specifications to control for the effect of industry membership on CSR contracting.

22

CSR_contract is recorded on a firm-year basis; thus it can take values of 0 and 1 for the same firm
in different years during our sample period, depending on whether the firm granted a CSR contract
in a given year or not.
Table 6 confirms our earlier finding that industry membership strongly influences the
probability of a firm offering a CSR contract. Five industry dummies are particularly significant
in all of our specifications: Mining and Minerals, Oil and Petroleum Products,
Construction/Materials, Steel Works, and Utilities. The dummy variables for all these industries
are positive and significant, suggesting that, all else equal, firms in these industries are more likely
to offer CSR-contingent compensation compared to firms in other industries. Consistent with
Hypothesis 3a, this finding lends credence to our earlier conjecture (based on simple summary
statistics in Table 1) that regulatory compliance and reduction in negative externalities (like
pollution, environmental damage, etc.) are important determinants of CSR contracting.
Table 6 also shows that, controlling for industry membership, the sign of
Earnings_volatility changes from positive to negative. It is plausible that industries that are more
volatile are more likely to offer CSR contracts, and therefore the Earnings_volatility captures this
industry effect if we do not control for it.
Size is an important determinant of CSR contracting. We find that firm_size is both
economically and statistically significant in all our regression specifications. This is unsurprising,

In order to minimize the effects of any outliers we use Firth’s penalized likelihood approach to address potential
issues of separability and small sample size.
22
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given that large firms tend to have a global presence and are generally more susceptible to analyst
and media coverage. Thus, it is possible that these firms motivate executives to pursue CSR
because of PR-related concerns.
Turning to corporate governance, we find that firms with strong governance are more likely
to offer CSR-contingent contracts. More independent boards, larger boards, and more industry
competition predict CSR contracting, while firms with classified boards, co-opted boards, CEO
duality are less likely to offer CSR contracts. For example, Classified_board (dummy variable
which takes a value of 1 if the board is classified) is significantly negative in all regressions.
Similarly, Board_independence, which captures the fraction of independent directors on the board,
is significantly positive. Combined, these findings support the view that firms with weak boards –
boards that are classified and/or boards that lack independence ((Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Cohen
and Wang, 2013) – are less likely to offer CSR contracts. To the extent that better-governed boards
have a positive impact on firm performance, these results, consistent with our Hypothesis 1a, seem
to indicate that CSR contracts are optimally offered with the intent of increasing firm value.
In Table 7, we use a multinomial logit regression to study the likelihood of offering
Objective and Subjective CSR-contingent contracts, as compared to no CSR contract, at the
executive level. Our dependent variable is the choice between (1) no CSR contract, (2) subjective
CSR contract, and (3) Objective CSR contract. The executive characteristics may also affect what
kind of contracts they are receiving. On the one hand, executives may self-select into these
contracts initially and may have a say on their compensation subsequently as they gain power in
the firms. On the other hand, firms may design different incentives for executives of different
characteristics.
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The results in Panel A suggest that female managers and managers with higher total
compensation are more likely to receive any kind of CSR contract, while measures proxied for
executive power or entrenchment such as share ownership, job tenure, CEO tenure (tenure in the
CEO position) predict CSR contracts negatively in general. Although firms feel obliged to give
CSR contracts to higher ranked executives (CEOs and managers with higher pay), managerial
power seems to also play a role in CSR contracting. In Panel B, we directly compare objective and
subjective contracts conditional on the existence of any kind of CSR contracts. We find that firms
are more likely to offer Objective CSR contracts when firm outcomes are less volatile (as indicated
by Earnings_volatility), firm growth opportunities are fewer (Tobin’s Q), CSR rating is lower,
corporate governance is stronger (Board_independence, Board_diversity, Board_cooption,
Analyst_coverage, and Industry_HHI), and executives are less entrenched (CEO tenure,
Executive_director, Share_ownerhip%, Tenure, and Duality). The results support Hypothesis 5
that Objective CSR contracts are offered optimally.
The low volatility of earnings (and lower Q perhaps) suggests that it makes sense to offer
Objective CSR-contingent contracts because firm outcomes are more predictable, making
Objective contracts more effective to evaluate and incentivize executives. We also see evidence
that firms with rather low CSR ratings are more likely to offer Objective CSR-contingent contracts.
Agency problems are potentially severe when the board members are co-opted (possibly the CEO
played a role hiring them), when the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and when analyst
coverage and industry competition are low (i.e. weaker external governance). Independent boards
and diversified boards, which are considered better monitors, strongly predict Objective contracts.
We also find that executives who serve on the board are more likely to receive Subjective contracts.
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Overall, firms with better governance, lower risk, and lower executive power are more
likely to offer Objective CSR-contingent contracts, compared to those who offer Subjective
contracts.
To the extent that industry membership and measurability of underlying CSR-contracting
variables have a potential impact on the likelihood of firms offering an Objective contract, we also
study the industry dummies and the six CSR category dummy variables in all our regressions
(controlling for all the executive characteristics, firm fundamentals and corporate governance
measures).23 These CSR dummy variables represent the six broad categories of CSR variables that
our sample firms have contracted on. For instance, one of the dummy variables that we introduce
is SHE_D which takes a value of 1 if the firm offered a CSR contract related to Safety, Health or
Environment, 0 otherwise. The dummy variables CSAT_D, ESAT_D, Diversity_D, Sust_D and
Ethics_D are defined similarly. Some of these CSR variables are relatively easier to measure (e.g.
those related to Safety, Health and Environment) than others (e.g. those related to Ethics), and we
expect this measurability (or the lack thereof) has an impact on the nature of CSR contract. In
general, we find that the CSR-contracting variables do have an impact on the nature of the contract.
In particular, firms are more likely to offer an Objective CSR contract if the executive
compensation is being tied to Safety, Health, Environment and Customer Satisfaction goals. To
the extent that these CSR variables are ‘more’ measurable than, say, Employee engagement or
Ethics, these results suggest that firms are more likely to offer an Objective CSR contract the more
measurable the underlying CSR-contracting variable is. For industry effects, similar to our
univariate analysis, we find that Oil and Petroleum Products, Textile, Consumer Durables, Steel

23

The results on these dummies are not shown in some tables for brevity, but they are available upon request.
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Works, Utilities, and Retail are more likely to offer Objective contracts, possibly because CSR is
more measurable in these industries.

4.2.2. Impact of CSR Contracts on Firms’ Social Standing
Having gained some understanding of why firms offer CSR contracts as well as why they
decide to offer Objective vs. Subjective CSR contracts, we next investigate the impact of these
contracts, if any, on a firm’s social standing. Our objective is to evaluate whether offering CSRcontingent contracts, Subjective or Objective, to executives has the desired impact of improving
corporate social performance. To do this, we estimate various specifications at the firm level in
which we regress firms’ one year-ahead KLD CSR ratings on CSR_contract and all other firmlevel and industry-level control variables. These regressions help inform us as to whether granting
CSR contract to its executives in a given year subsequently helps improve the firm’s future social
standing, after controlling for the firm’s current social standing.
In Table 8 we compare firms with Objective or Subjective CSR contracts to those that did
not grant any CSR contracts. The dependent variable is again the CSR_rating at year t+1.
Objective_contract takes a value of 1 if the firm granted at least one Objective contract in that year,
and 0 if the firm did not grant any CSR contracts. The coefficient of Objective_contract is
significantly positive, suggesting that such contracts are effective in increasing CSR ratings. The
negative interaction effect between Objective_contract and CSR_ratingt implies that such
contracts are more (less) effective in firms with low (high) CSR standings. Interestingly, we find
evidence suggesting that Objective contracts are less effective when firm outcomes are more
volatile and firm risk is higher. This is consistent with our Hypothesis 6 that Objective contract
loses its incentive effect when outcomes are volatile and unpredictable.
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In terms of underlying CSR variables, we find in Column 2 that contracting Objectively on
safety, health and environment (SHE_D), customer/client satisfaction (CSAT_D) and sustainability
(Sust_D) are more effective than contracting on employee satisfaction/engagement (ESAT_D),
diversity (Diversity_D) and Ethics (Ethics_D).
In Columns 3 and 4 we repeat the exercise by only comparing firms with Subjective CSR
contracts to those with none. Here we find that the coefficient on Subjective_contract is positive
and significant. This is similar to the result we observed in Columns 1 and 2 on Objective_contract,
suggesting both kinds of contracts are effective. This is consistent with Hypothesis 4a that firms
that offer CSR contracts experience an increase in their subsequent CSR ratings. This result stands
even after we control for firms’ current CSR ratings. The differences are found when studying
interaction terms, none of which are significant.
For underlying CSR variables in Column 4, contracting Subjectively on SHE_D, ESAT_D,
Diversity_D, Sust_D, and Ethics_D are more effective than on CSAT_D. Comparing to Column 2,
Objective contracts on customer satisfaction (CSAT_D) are more effective than Subjective
contracts; Subjective contracts on diversity and ethics are more effective than Objective contracts.
These results provide some guidance on when to use Objective contracts and when to use
Subjective ones.
Finally, in Table 9, we directly compare the effectiveness of Objective contracts and
Subjective contracts, after excluding all firms without CSR contracts. Column 1 suggests that both
contracts are not significantly different in improving CSR standing. Column 2 shows that
Objective contracts are more useful in firms with currently low CSR rating. Arguably, assigning a
specific dollar amount or compensation percentage is a stronger incentive to managers than using
vague terms in the compensation contract, all else equal. In Column 3, we find that Objective
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contract is not as effective when firm risk is high. This is consistent with our previous findings and
Hypothesis 6 that Subjective contracts are specifically useful in firms with volatile outcomes.
Column 4 implies Subjective contracts are more useful under good corporate governance, proxied
by board independence and board diversity. Subjective contracts are arguably more difficult for
the boards to monitor and evaluate, and easier for the executives to manipulate, especially when
board governance is weaker. The results remain robust in Column 5 when we include all
independent variables.

5. Robustness Tests
5.1. Granger Causality Analysis
Reverse causality is possible, although it is not very likely that the CSR contracting can
significantly impact firm fundamentals such as firm size. To study which direction of causality
dominates, we conduct the Granger Causality tests (Granger, 1969) to examine the nature of
relations between CSR contract and firm characteristics and the direction of causality. Given the
time series of the data on two variables X and Y, X is said to “Granger cause” Y if the lagged
values of X are significant predictors of Y incremental to lagged values of Y.
To determine the optimal lag lengths n, we refer to the Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
(Schwarz, 1978; Risannen, 1978) and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (QIC) (Hannan and
Quinn, 1979) and conclude the appropriate lengths should be 2 years for most firm
characteristics.24

24

For robustness, we also test 1, 2, and 3 year lags and obtain similar results.

37

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3019985

Consistent with our hypothesis, the evidence in Table 10 suggests that, in general, the causality
from firm-level variables to CSR contract is much stronger than the reverse causality. The only
exception we find is that CSR contract seems to affect firms’ CSR standings significantly, while
the reverse causality is only marginally significant.
5.2.GMM and Propensity Score Matching
CSR contract and CSR rating may have two-way causality as indicated by the Granger
Causality test. In our main results in Tables 8 and 9, we address this issue by controlling for the
current CSR rating and using CSR contract to predict future CSR rating. We find CSR contract
has incremental explanatory power in all our regressions.25
In this section, we further mitigate the endogeneity problem. The first method we use is the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We apply the dynamic GMM estimator to our panel
data to control for the dynamic nature of the relationship between CSR contract and CSR rating.
Unlike the traditional fixed-effects estimates we use in our main tests, GMM allows the current
CSR contracting to be influenced by previous realizations of, or shocks to, past CSR rating. If the
underlying economic process itself is dynamic – in our case, if current contract is related to past
rating – then it is possible to use some combination of variables from the firm's history as valid
instruments to account for simultaneity (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Specifically, we include all
the independent variables (including past CSR rating and industry fixed effects), which we use in
Table 6 to predict CSR contract, as instruments for the current CSR contract. Table 10 Panel B

25

Using lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable allows corporate finance empiricists to control for
potential dynamic panel bias (Flannery and Hankins, 2013).
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shows that the predicted value of CSR contract still has a significantly positive effect on future
CSR rating.
The second method we use is the Propensity Score Matching (PSM). In particular, we match
treatment firms with control firms based on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983),
and then study the future CSR ratings of these two groups of firms that appear similar, but one
group adopted CSR contracts and the other did not. We use the logistic regression in Table 6 to
estimate propensity score for each firm and then match CSR-contracting firms with non-CSRcontracting firms that have the closest propensity scores, so that these two groups appear similar
in terms of firm fundamentals, corporate governance metrics, industry membership as well as
current CSR ratings. We find a significant difference in subsequent CSR performance between the
two groups. Specifically, the CSR-contracting group has future CSR rating of 2.82 on average,
while the non-CSR contracting group has only 2.51. The multivariate analysis on the matched
subsample also suggests a positive effect of CSR contract on future CSR rating. Firms offering
CSR contracts to their executives are more likely to improve their CSR performance in the future
than similar firms that do not offer such contracts.

6. Conclusion
An emerging practice in executive compensation incentive is to link a portion of a
manager’s compensation to CSR-related initiatives. In this paper, we collect novel data on such
compensation contracts and attempt to understand whether they generally constitute optimal
contracting or represent a manifestation of agency problems.
Firms’ CSR engagements have become particularly important to stakeholders in recent
times; many corporations now dedicate a section of their annual reports to CSR activities. Whether
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these activities increase firm value/performance has been the subject of much research, and the
evidence in favor of CSR increasing firm value/performance is (at best) mixed. One reason for this
mixed evidence is that some firms tout CSR engagement merely for window-dressing purposes.
Popular press and practitioners have advocated that firms should directly tie their executives’
compensation to achieving CSR targets in order to overcome such window-dressing incentives.
However, as the managerial power theory suggests, tying executive compensation to CSR can
create perverse incentives as well; executives can use such ‘sustainability bonuses’ to gear up their
compensation to the detriment of firm value.
In this paper, we inform the debate on the worth of CSR-contingent compensation contracts
by examining the nature of firm-specific, industry-specific, and executive-specific factors that
correlate with their existence. Specifically, using hand-collected data on CSR-contingent
compensation contracts, we classify S&P 500 firms as having no CSR contract, a Subjective CSR
contract, or an Objective CSR contract, and identify the CSR-contracting variables underlying
these contracts. We then examine the factors that are characteristically different about the firms
granting such contracts and the efficacy of these contracts under different situations. Our
comprehensive analysis of the CSR-contingent compensation generates four sets of findings:
First, we find that CSR-contracting practice varies significantly across industries and across
CSR variables contracted on. These variations seem to be consistent with the Stakeholder theory
and the Institutional theory.
Second, CSR-contracting firms tend to be larger, have lower volatility of firm outcomes
(e.g., volatilities of earnings and stock returns) and have stronger corporate governance.
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Third, Objective CSR contracts, as compared to Subjective ones, are offered more often in
firms with lower volatility of outcomes, fewer investment opportunities, lower CSR ratings, and
stronger governance.
Fourth, CSR contracts are effective in improving future CSR ratings, especially for firms
with low volatility and currently low CSR ratings. Subjective CSR contracts become more
effective for firms with high volatility, strong governance, and currently high CSR rating.
These findings are generally consistent with our hypotheses of optimal contracting. In
conclusion, our paper attempts to understand the increasingly popular practice of CSR-contingent
compensation contracting and adds another important and emerging perspective to the extensive
literature on the optimal design of executive compensation. Using detailed CSR-contracting data,
ours is the first paper to perform a thorough examination of the factors correlating with CSRcontingent compensation contracts and to differentiate between Subjective and Objective CSR
contracts and between different CSR-contracting variables that the compensation is contracted on.
Our findings will be particularly useful for boards and policymakers in designing CSR-contingent
compensation contracts in terms of when to use CSR contract, what CSR variables to contract on,
and what type of CSR contracts to offer. Managers with proper incentives through such contracts
can then create value for shareholders and stakeholders.
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Appendix 1: Variable Description and Construction
1. Variable Description
Variable

Definition

Firm Fundamentals
Firm_size

The natural logarithm of Net Asset where Net Asset is total asset less cash and short-term
investments.
Idiosyncratic volatility: the standard deviation of daily excess stock returns using the Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model.
The ratio of the sum of market value of equity and the book value of debt to total assets

Firm_risk
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Leverage

Return on assets: Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided
by total assets
The market value of firm’s debt

Earnings_volatility

Variance of past five years of earnings.

Credit_rating

The S&P credit ratings from AAA (1) to D (24).

CSR_rating

KLD scores (total strengths minus total concerns) aggregated across the categories of
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product.
Takes values of 1 to 5 according to the five firm life cycle stages (Dickinson, 2011):
introduction, growth, mature, shake-out, and decline, based on expected cash flow generated
separately from operating, investing, and financing.

Life_stage

Corporate Governance
Board_independence

The number of independent outside directors divided by board size.

Board_size

The number of directors in the board.

Board_diversity

Duality

A multidimensional index of board diversity in gender, age, tenure, ethnicity, financial
expertise, and breadth of board experience.
A dummy variable = 1 if the directors in the board are elected to staggered terms instead of
annual term and 0 if not.
the number of directors appointed after the CEO assumes office divided by board size (Coles,
Daniel, and Naveen, 2014)
A dummy variable = 1 if the firm's CEO also serves as the chairman of the board

Analyst_coverage

The number of analysts following

Industry_HHI

Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of industry concentration, as a proxy for product market
competition, defined as the sum of the squares of market shares of the firms operating in the
industry
Percentage of company's outstanding common shares held by institutions.

Classified_board
Board_cooption

Institutional_ownership

Institutional_ownership_HHI Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of institutional investor ownership concentration, which is
the sum of the squared ownerships in a firm.
Executive Characteristics
Age

Executive’s age

Female

A dummy variable = 1 for female and 0 for male.

CEO

A dummy variable = 1 for the CEO of the firm year and 0 for non-CEO executives

CEO tenure

the number of years the executive has been CEO at this firm

Executive_director

A dummy variable = 1 if an executive is also a board member and 0 otherwise.

Total_compensation

Executive’s total compensation, including salary, bonus, grants of restricted stock, grants of
stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, gross-ups for tax liabilities, perquisites,
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Share_ownership%

preferential discounts on stock purchases, contributions to benefit plans, severance payments,
and all other compensation.
The percentage of shares owned by the executive.

Tenure

the number of years the executive has worked in this firm

CSR Contract characteristics
CSR_contract
Objective_contract

Subjective_contract
Industry dummies
SHE_D
CSAT_D
ESAT_D
Diversity_D
Sust_D
Ethics_D

A dummy variable = 1 if an executive's compensation contract has a CSR-related incentive
component and 0 otherwise
A dummy variable = 1 if the CSR contract is formulaic, i.e., clearly specifying the weights (the
percentage or amount of compensation) attached to specific CSR-related activities and 0
otherwise
A dummy variable = 1 if the CSR contract is not formulaic, i.e., without any information about
the weights attached to specific CSR-related activities and 0 otherwise
Dummy variables for each of the Fama-French 17 industries
Dummy variable, that takes a value of 1if executive compensation is tied to Safety, Health or
Environment.
Dummy variable, that takes a value of 1if executive compensation is tied to customer or client
satisfaction.
Dummy variable, that takes a value of 1if executive compensation is tied to employee
satisfaction/engagement.
Dummy variable, that takes a value of 1if executive compensation is tied to promoting
diversity.
Dummy variable, that takes a value of 1if executive compensation is tied to sustainability,
community engagement, corporate social responsibility, etc.
Dummy variable, that takes a value of 1if executive compensation is tied to promoting ethical
conduct.

2. Variable Construction
Below we provide details about our construction of some more complicated variables we
use.
For the Board_diversity index, we collect each board member’s individual information
from the ISS (formerly Riskmetrics) database. Then we calculate the number of female members
in the board, the number of finance experts, the average number of outside board seats, the standard
deviations of age and tenure in the board, and the Herfindahl index of ethnicity (categorized as
White/Caucasian, African American, Asian, Hispanic, and other). These six dimensions include
both demographic and cognitive aspects as suggested by the literature (e.g., Milliken and Martins,
1996). We normalize each diversity dimension to make their scale comparable. Then we construct
the Board_diversity index with each component equally weighted:
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Board_diversity = normalized female% + normalized age standard deviation +
normalized tenure standard deviation + normalized number of outside board seats +
normalized finance expert% + normalized (1- ethnicity Herfindahl index).

For the Life_stage measure, we follow Dickinson (2011) to assign a company’s life cycle
stage based on the evaluation of operating cash flows, investing cash flows, and financing cash
flows. The life stage is determined by a company’s cash flow patterns, according to the table below.
The variable Life_stage takes values of one to five according to the five life cycle stages:
introduction, growth, mature, shake-out, and decline. For example, if a company constantly has
positive financing cash flows but negative operating and investing cash flows, then the company
is categorized into the introduction stage.
Definition
Operating CF
Investing CF
Financing CF

Calculation
Sign
Sign
Sign

Introduction
+

Growth
+
+

Mature
+
-

-

Shake-out
+
+
+
+
+
-
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Decline
+
+
+
-

Appendix 2: Examples of Language Used in Subjective and Objective CSR Contracts
The table below shows examples of language used in Objective and Subjective CSR-contingent
compensation contracts across the six broad CSR categories identified in this paper. We classify Objective
contracts if the proxy statement clearly indicates how (in terms of dollar amount or compensation %)
executive compensation is tied to achievement of CSR-related milestones. The table below highlights [in
bold] the exact percentage of payout promised to executives with respect to achievement of CSR-related
initiatives. In contrast, the language used in Subjective contracts does not give any such indication.
CSR Category

Sample Contracting Language in an
Objective CSR Contract (Paraphrased)

Sample Contracting Language in a Subjective
CSR Contract (Paraphrased)

Safety, Health and Environment

10% weight assigned to "positive year-to-year
trend in number of serious accidents", successful
implementation of safety programs scheduled for
implementation in AES business, and "positive
year-to-year trend in Lost Time Incidents
recorded". [1]

"In determining individual awards, the
Compensation Committee evaluated each
officer's performance in conjuntion with division
and overall corporate performance. These
objectives related to … health and safety
metrics…" [7]

Customer/Client Satisfaction

5% - 10% weight (for each of the top
executives) assigned to "Customer Satisfaction "Incentive awards based on various financial
Utility Customers" where "...performance is
measures including … customer satisfaction and
measured based on customer satisfaction
employee satisfaction..." [8]
through surveys performed by an outside
vendor… " [2]

Employee Satisfaction

10% weight assigned to "People Leadership
and Talent Management" with the goal to "…
effectively lead, maximize development
opportunities, and ensure employee engagement
and productivity." [3]

"… (Mr. Frazier got compensated for
maintaining) strong employee engagement during
difficult economic circumstances, as evidenced
by employee surveys and low turnover." [9]

Diversity

3.3% of the target payout (for all top
executives) is assigned to diversity with the goal
to "… to support the Company’s inclusive and
diverse workplace." [4]

"… the bonuses of each of our (NEOs)… may
be modified up or down based on the extent to
which each executive promotes actions that
promote diversity…" [10]

Corporate
10% weight is assigned to Environmental and
Citizenship/Sustainability/Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives as part of the
Social Responsibility
Annual Incentive Program (AIP). [5]

The Compensation Committee determined
awards based on executives' ongoing
commitment towards corporate citizenship and
sustainability initiatives, including "...the
continued expansion of its Skills to Succeed
corporate citizenship initiatives…" [11]

Mandatory 10% reduction of target
performance incentive for failure to complete
annual ethics training." [6]

"… the compensation plan balances financial
results with other Company values such as …
ethical conduct." [12]

Ethics

[1] AES Corp., 2011 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/874761/000119312512089733/d303957ddef14a.htm
[2] Integrys Holding Inc., 2010 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916863/000119312511084974/ddef14a.htm
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[3] NRG Energy Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1013871/000104746914002997/a2219239zdef14a.htm
[4] PepCo Holdings Inc., 2013 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1135971/000157104914000929/t1400402-proxy.htm
[5] Kohl’s Corp., 2009 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/885639/000119312510068565/ddef14a.htm
[6] CA Inc., 2011 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/356028/000119312512266860/d363732ddef14a.htm
[7] Aptiv PLC., 2012 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1521332/000119312513101013/d494867ddef14a.htm
[8] Aetna Inc., 2011 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1122304/000095012311034425/y89007def14a.htm
[9] Genworth Financial Inc., 2011 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1276520/000119312511087588/ddef14a.htm
[10] Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2011 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/14272/000119312512123606/d287079ddef14a.htm
[11] Accenture PLC, 2011 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467373/000119312511345770/d262678ddef14a.htm
[12] Air Products and Chemicals Inc., 2011 Proxy Statement:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2969/000119312511340294/d195834ddef14a.htm
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Table 1: Distribution of CSR-Contracting Firms across Industries
This table presents the distribution of sample firms with CSR contracts vs. firms without across the Fama-French 17 industries in each sample year. Yes indicates the number
of sample firms that offered a CSR-contingent contract, while No indicates the number of firms that did not. Yes (%) expresses Yes as a percentage. We classify a firm as
having granted a CSR-contingent compensation contract if its proxy statement indicates that one or more of its executives received compensation linked to CSR-related
metrics.
FF17 Industries

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Yes

No

Yes (%)

Yes

No

Yes (%)

Yes

No

Yes (%)

Yes

No

Yes (%)

Yes

No

Yes (%)

Food

12

11

52.17%

12

11

52.17%

11

12

47.83%

12

12

50.00%

9

9

50.00%

Mining and Minerals

5

0

100.00%

5

0

100.00%

4

0

100.00%

5

0

100.00%

4

0

100.00%

Oil & Petroleum Products

24

7

77.42%

25

7

78.13%

28

5

84.85%

27

6

81.82%

32

3

91.43%

Textile App. & Footwear

1

6

14.29%

1

6

14.29%

1

6

14.29%

1

7

12.50%

0

3

0.00%

Consumer Durables

3

4

42.86%

3

4

42.86%

2

5

28.57%

3

4

42.86%

1

6

14.29%

Chemicals

7

2

77.78%

5

5

50.00%

6

4

60.00%

6

3

66.67%

7

3

70.00%

Drugs, Soap, Tobacco

12

15

44.44%

10

16

38.46%

10

16

38.46%

11

16

40.74%

9

18

33.33%

Construction

8

6

57.14%

8

6

57.14%

7

7

50.00%

7

7

50.00%

5

8

38.46%

Steel Works

2

1

66.67%

2

1

66.67%

2

1

66.67%

2

2

50.00%

2

1

66.67%

Fabricated Products

0

2

0.00%

0

2

0.00%

0

2

0.00%

0

2

0.00%

0

2

0.00%

Machinery & Bus. Equip.

14

44

24.14%

11

48

18.64%

17

43

28.33%

22

39

36.07%

21

35

37.50%

Automobiles

1

6

14.29%

3

5

37.50%

3

6

33.33%

4

5

44.44%

4

5

44.44%

Transportation

9

10

47.37%

8

10

44.44%

9

10

47.37%

9

10

47.37%

8

9

47.06%

Utilities

30

4

88.24%

30

4

88.24%

31

3

91.18%

31

3

91.18%

31

3

91.18%

Retail

9

20

31.03%

11

18

37.93%

13

17

43.33%

12

18

40.00%

4

6

40.00%

Financials

23

59

28.05%

28

55

33.73%

32

51

38.55%

31

53

36.90%

33

51

39.29%

Other

32

63

33.68%

35

63

35.71%

34

64

34.69%

33

68

32.67%

29

57

33.72%

TOTAL

192

260

42.48%

197

261

43.01%

210

252

45.45%

216

255

45.86%

199

219

47.61%
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Table 2: Distribution of CSR-Contracting Firms across Primary CSR Categories
The table shows the distribution of CSR-contracting firms across six primary contracting variables in each of Fama-French 17 industries during 2009 - 2013. We consider a
firm as having contracted on a particular CSR category in a given year if at least one of its executives’ compensation was tied to that CSR category in that year. Total indicates
the total number of firms that offered a CSR contract in a particular CSR category and industry, while the percentage in parenthesis indicates how much the total is as a
percentage of the total number of firms that offered any type of CSR contract in that industry. Finally, Obj. indicates the number of “Objective” CSR contracts offered in a
given industry. Thus, the difference between Total and Obj. indicates the number of “Subjective” CSR contracts. See Section 3 “Data and Variable Description” for details

FF17 Industries

Food
Mining and Minerals
Oil and Petroleum
Textile App. &
Footwear
Consumer Durables
Chemicals
Drugs, Soap, Tobacco
Construction
Steel Works
Fabricated Products
Machinery and Bus.
Equip.
Automobiles
Transportation
Utilities
Retail
Financials
Other
TOTAL

Customer
Satisfaction

Safety, Health
and Environment

Employee
Satisfaction

Diversity

Sustainability /
Corporate
Responsibility

Ethics

Obj.

Total

Obj.

Total

Obj.

Total

Obj.

Total

Obj.

Total

Obj.

Total

8
6
71

20 (35.7%)
23 (100.0%)
131 (96.3%)

0
0
0

15 (26.8%)
0 (0.0%)
1 (0.7%)

0
1
1

21 (37.5%)
3 (13.0%)
1 (0.7%)

3
0
8

32 (57.1%)
0 (0.0%)
21 (15.4%)

0
1
6

13 (23.21%)
8 (34.78%)
11 (8.09%)

3
0
11

17 (30.4%)
3 (13.0%)
24 (17.7%)

4

4 (100.0%)

0

0 (0.0%)

0

0 (0.0%)

4

4 (100.0%)

0

0 (0%)

0

0 (0.0%)

6
10
1
7
10
NA

8 (66.7%)
30 (96.8%)
14 (26.9%)
17 (48.6%)
10 (100.0%)
NA

1
4
5
6
5
NA

1 (8.3%)
5 (16.1%)
13 (25.0%)
17 (48.6%)
5 (50.0%)
NA

0
3
0
0
0
NA

2 (16.7%)
5 (16.1%)
17 (32.7%)
1 (2.9%)
0 (0.0%)
NA

0
7
24
4
0
NA

1 (8.3%)
9 (29.0%)
26 (50.0%)
4 (11.4%)
5 (50.0%)
NA

0
1
0
0
0
NA

1 (8.33%)
9 (29.03%)
5 (9.62%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
NA

0
0
6
2
5
NA

0 (0.0%)
5 (16.1%)
13 (25.0%)
9 (25.7%)
5 (50.0%)
NA

2

27 (31.8%)

13

56 (65.9%)

8

30 (35.3%)

24

27 (31.8%)

1

17 (20%)

0

13 (15.3%)

0
0
99
0
8
5

3 (20.0%)
22 (51.2%)
143 (93.5%)
5 (10.2%)
15 (10.2%)
26 (15.9%)

0
5
56
18
18
24

5 (33.3%)
23 (53.5%)
82 (53.6%)
34 (69.4%)
64 (43.5%)
76 (46.6%)

0
0
18
1
9
14

2 (13.3%)
8 (18.6%)
22 (14.4%)
9 (18.4%)
54 (36.7%)
54 (33.1%)

9
12
12
11
38
47

9 (60.0%)
18 (41.9%)
45 (4.4%)
18 (36.7%)
44 (30.0%)
56 (34.4%)

0
0
3
7
7
2

0 (0%)
10 (23.26%)
6 (3.92%)
7 (14.29%)
26 (17.69%)
39 (23.93%)

0
0
14
3
4
10

4 (26.7%)
10 (23.3%)
28 (18.3%)
8 (16.3%)
44 (29.9%)
39 (23.9%)

237

498 (49.1%)

155

397 (39.2%)

55

229 (22.6%)

203

319 (31.5%)

28

152 (15.0%)

58

222 (21.9%)

54
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Table 3: Distribution of Objective and Subjective CSR-Contracting Firms across Industries
This table presents the distribution of sample firms with Objective CSR contracts vs. firms with Subjective contracts across the Fama-French 17 industries in each sample
year. Ob. indicates the number of CSR-contracting firms that offered an Objective CSR-contingent contract, while Sub. indicates the number of CSR-contracting firms that
offered a Subjective CSR contract. Ob. (%) expresses Ob. as a percentage. We classify a firm as having granted a Subjective CSR-contract if the proxy statement does not
clearly indicate how (in terms of dollar amount or compensation %) executive compensation is tied to achievement of CSR-related milestones. In contrast, we classify a
firm as having granted an Objective contract if the proxy statement clearly indicates how compensation is tied to achievement of CSR-related milestones.
FF17 Industries

2009
Ob.

Sub.

Food

1

Mining and Minerals

1

Oil and Petroleum Products

2010
Ob.(%)

Ob.

Sub.

11

8.33%

1

4

20.00%

1

12

12

50.00%

Textile App. & Footwear

1

0

Consumer Durables

1

Chemicals

2

Drugs, Soap, Tobacco

2011

2012

2013

Ob.(%)

Ob.

Sub.

Ob.(%)

Ob.

Sub.

Ob.(%)

Ob.

Sub.

Ob.(%)

11

8.33%

2

9

18.18%

2

10

16.67%

2

7

22.22%

4

20.00%

1

3

25.00%

1

4

20.00%

2

2

50.00%

13

12

52.00%

15

13

53.57%

14

13

51.85%

17

15

53.13%

100.00%

1

0

100.00%

1

0

100.00%

1

0

100.00%

0

0

NA

2

33.33%

1

2

33.33%

2

0

100.00%

1

2

33.33%

1

0

100.00%

5

28.57%

3

2

60.00%

2

4

33.33%

1

5

16.67%

2

5

28.57%

2

10

16.67%

2

8

20.00%

1

9

10.00%

1

10

9.09%

2

7

22.22%

Construction

2

6

25.00%

2

6

25.00%

2

5

28.57%

3

4

42.86%

2

3

40.00%

Steel Works

2

0

100.00%

2

0

100.00%

2

0

100.00%

2

0

100.00%

2

0

100.00%

Fabricated Products

0

0

NA

0

0

NA

0

0

NA

0

0

NA

0

0

NA

Machinery and Bus. Equip.

3

11

21.43%

2

9

18.18%

4

13

23.53%

4

18

18.18%

3

18

14.29%

Automobiles

0

1

0.00%

0

3

0.00%

0

3

0.00%

0

4

0.00%

0

4

0.00%

Transportation

2

7

22.22%

2

6

25.00%

2

7

22.22%

2

7

22.22%

2

6

25.00%

Utilities

20

10

66.67%

21

9

70.00%

21

10

67.74%

19

12

61.29%

21

10

67.74%

Retail

4

5

44.44%

4

7

36.36%

5

8

38.46%

5

7

41.67%

3

1

75.00%

Financials

4

19

17.39%

5

23

17.86%

5

27

15.63%

6

25

19.35%

5

28

15.15%

Other

6

26

18.75%

10

25

28.57%

9

25

26.47%

7

26

21.21%

6

23

20.69%

TOTAL

63

129

32.81%

70

127

35.53%

74

136

35.24%

69

147

31.94%

70

129

35.18%

55
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Table 4: Distribution of Objective and Subjective CSR-Contracting Firms across Primary CSR-Contracting Variables
This table shows the number (percentage) of firms that offered Objective and Subjective CSR-contracts with respect to the primary CSR-contracting variables in
each sample year. The six primary CSR-contracting categories indicate the CSR targets that the CSR contracts are linked to. We classify a firm as having granted
a Subjective CSR-contract if the proxy statement does not clearly indicate how (in terms of dollar amount or compensation %) executive compensation is tied to
achievement of CSR-related milestones. In contrast, we classify a firm as having granted an Objective contract if the proxy statement clearly indicates how
compensation is tied to achievement of CSR-related milestones.
Primary CSR-Contracting Categories Contract Type
Safety, Health and Environment
Customer/Client Satisfaction
Employee Satisfaction/Engagement
Diversity
Sustainability and Social Responsibility
Ethics

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Objective

43 (46%)

46 (49%)

49 (48%)

47 (45%)

52 (48%)

Subjective

50 (54%)

48 (51%)

54 (52%)

56 (54%)

55 (51%)

Objective

29 (36%)

33 (42%)

35 (43%)

30 (37%)

28 (37%)

Subjective

52 (64%)

46 (58%)

46 (57%)

48 (63%)

48 (63%)

Objective

9 (21%)

10 (22%)

13 (25%)

9 (20%)

10 (22%)

Subjective

34 (79%)

35 (78%)

40 (75%)

36 (80%)

34 (77%)

Objective

22 (34%)

18 (28%)

18 (25%)

15 (21%)

15 (24%)

Subjective

42 (66%)

46 (72%)

53 (75%)

58 (80%)

48 (76%)

Objective

6 (22%)

7 (27%)

5 (18%)

5 (14%)

5 (14%)

Subjective

21 (78%)

19 (73%)

23 (82%)

31 (86%)

30 (86%)

Objective

12 (26%)

12 (29%)

13 (29%)

11 (22%)

10 (23%)

Subjective

34 (74%)

30 (71%)

32 (71%)

40 (78%)

33 (77%)
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Table 5: Summary Statistics and Correlations
This table shows a univariate analysis of our data sample. Panel A provides the summary statistics. Column 1 compares
firms that granted a CSR-contingent contract to those that did not. Column 2 compares firms that granted an Objective
CSR-contingent contract to those with a Subjective one. Panel B shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between
CSR_contract dummy variable and some key firm-level variables. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. T-statistics
are obtained from a difference-in-means test. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of
significance, respectively.
Panel A: Summary Statistics

CSR
Contract
Firm Fundamentals
Firm_size
9.82
Firm_risk
0.34
Tobin’s Q
1.66
ROA (%)
13.81
MktLev (%)
18.63
Earnings_volatility
0.04
Credit_rating
7.64
CSR_rating
2.68
Life_stage
2.82
Corporate Governance Variables
Board_independence
0.83
Board_size
11.16
Board_diversity
20.84
Classified_board
0.32
Board_cooption
0.41
Duality
0.66
Analyst_coverage
24.32
Industry_HHI
0.15
Institutional_ownership (%)
70.19
Institutional_ownership_HHI
0.04

Column 1
No CSR
Contract

Column 2
T-Statistic

Objective

Subjective

T-Statistic

9.26
0.43
2.06
14.70
15.67
0.04
6.85
2.45
2.87

11.01***
-8.19***
-18.07***
-8.57**
13.08***
-1.24
6.79***
1.18
-4.36***

9.77
0.35
1.45
12.98
22.22
0.04
8.24
1.97
2.71

9.84
0.34
1.76
14.24
16.77
0.04
7.36
3.01
2.87

-1.36
-0.75
-14.11***
-7.66***
16.30***
0.55
9.86***
-8.55***
-10.64***

0.80
10.49
21.11
0.46
0.45
0.61
23.33
0.18
75.7
0.05

6.33***
15.93***
-1.08
-6.34***
-5.32***
4.08***
1.74*
-8.73***
-10.49***
-2.25**

0.84
11.04
20.94
0.28
0.41
0.62
23.77
0.11
64.32
0.05

0.82
11.22
20.80
0.29
0.41
0.68
24.54
0.17
73.18
0.04

7.63***
-3.27***
1.26
0.63
-0.21
-4.18***
-2.14**
-15.09***
-10.55***
3.62***

Panel B: Correlations between Key Firm-Level Variables
CSR_
Firm_
contract size
CSR_contract
1
0.22***
Firm_size
1
Firm_risk
Tobin's Q
ROA
Leverage
Credit_rating
CSR_rating
Board_independence

Firm_
Tobin's Q
risk
-0.07*** -0.15***
0.03*** -0.51***
1
-0.06***
1

ROA
-0.07***
-0.45***
-0.17***
0.63***
1

Leverage Credit_
CSR_
Board_
rating
rating
independence
0.11***
0.10***
0.03***
0.15***
0.21***
0.11***
0.21***
0.20***
0.04***
0.07***
-0.18***
-0.03***
-0.41*** -0.38***
0.01
-0.14***
-0.31*** -0.23***
0.01
-0.13***
1
0.43***
-0.11***
0.05***
1
-0.09***
0.06***
1
0.17***
1
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Table 6: Likelihood of Offering CSR–Contingent Contracts - Firm-Level Regressions
This table shows the results from estimating the penalized logistic regressions, with CSR_contract as the dependent variable.
CSR_contract takes a value of 1 if the firm offers CSR contract to at least one executive, 0 otherwise. Definitions of all the
variables are in Appendix 1. All firm-level variables are measured at the end of preceding fiscal year. Industry dummies are
based on the Fama-French 17 industries. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

Intercept
Firm Fundamentals
Firm_size
Firm_risk
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Leverage
Earnings_volatility
Credit_rating
CSR_rating
Life_stage
Corporate Governance
Board_independence
Board_size
Board_diversity
Classified_board
Board_cooption
Duality
Analyst_coverage
Industry_HHI
Institutional_ownership
Institutional_ownership_HHI
Industry Dummies
Food
Mining and Minerals
Oil and Petroleum Products
Textile
Consumer Durables
Chemicals
Drugs, Soap &Tobacco
Construction / Materials
Steel Works
Fabricated Products
Mach. and Bus. Equip
Automobiles
Transportation
Utilities
Retail
Financials
N
R2
CSR_contract = 1

1
-3.66***

2
-5.06***

3
-2.54***

4
-5.87***

0.36***
-3.08***
-0.15*
2.23**
1.62***
2.45**
0.02*
0.02
-0.14*

0.44***
-0.66
-0.08
1.84*
0.38
-3.01*
0.01
0.03*
0.12

0.43***
-0.13
-0.19**
1.15
1.90***
2.98**
0.02
0.01
-0.17*

0.37***
-0.28
-0.13
1.74*
0.95
-2.73
-0.02
0.03*
0.25*

2.18***
0.20***
-0.03
-0.33***
-0.63***
-0.05*
0.02*
-1.47***
0.01
0.41

1.54**
0.09***
-0.02
-0.25**
-0.66***
-0.11**
0.02
-1.25*
-0.00
0.55

1688
0.14
785

0.77**
4.54***
1.91***
-0.23
0.67
0.52
0.14
1.08***
1.67***
-2.03
-0.36*
0.30
0.25
2.46***
0.40
-0.45*
1681
0.28
781

1760
0.09
811

0.47*
4.82***
1.84***
-0.55
0.20
0.98**
0.19
0.98***
1.81***
-0.21
-0.02
0.24
0.22
2.49***
0.17
-0.70***
1710
0.20
787
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Table 7: Likelihood of Objective vs. Subjective CSR-contingent Contracts
This table shows the results from a multinomial logit regression at the executive level. The dependent variable CSR_contract
takes a value of 0 for no CSR contract, 1 for a Subjective CSR contract, and 2 for an Objective contract. Panel A assumes no
contract as the base category, and Panel B assumes Subjective contract as the base category. Variable definitions are in Appendix
1. Industry dummies are used based on Fama-French 17 industries. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1% respectively.
Panel A:
Panel B:
Base category: No contract
Base category: Subjective
Subjective
Objective
Objective
Intercept
Executive Characteristics
Age
Female
CEO
CEO tenure
Executive_director
Total_compensation
Share_ownership%
Tenure
Firm Fundamentals
Firm_size
Firm_risk
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Leverage
Earnings_volatility
Credit_rating
CSR_rating
Life_stage
Corporate Governance
Board_independence
Board_size
Board_diversity
Classified_board
Board_cooption
Duality
Analyst_coverage
Industry_HHI
Institutional_ownership
Institutional_ownership_HHI
N
R2

1
-3.97***

2
-6.64***

3
-2.63***

-0.00
0.25***
0.12
-0.02*
-0.01
0.02***
0.14
-0.00

-0.02
0.57***
0.04
0.01
-0.22*
0.05***
-0.30**
-0.02**

-0.01
0.30**
-0.10
0.02
-0.24**
0.03**
-0.43**
-0.02*

0.33***
-0.86
0.23
-0.56
-0.58
6.80***
0.01
0.03***
0.15***

0.33***
-0.59
-0.28*
2.29***
1.76***
-9.95***
0.01
0.01
-0.13***

0.01
-0.32
-0.50***
2.72***
2.28***
-14.74***
0.00
-0.02**
-0.27***

0.41
0.11***
-0.08***
-0.29***
-0.50***
0.24
0.00
2.24***
0.04
-1.79***
8349
0.23

3.08***
0.08***
-0.02
-0.18
-0.95***
-0.62***
0.01*
-3.65***
-0.03
-1.03***

2.69***
-0.04
0.07***
0.10
-0.45***
-0.89***
0.01*
-5.95***
-0.08
0.77
3797
0.30
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Table 8: CSR Ratings: Subjective and Objective CSR Contracts vs. No CSR Contracts
This table shows the results from estimating various firm-level specifications in which we assess how the firm’s
decision to grant a Subjective or an Objective CSR contract in Year t influences its subsequent KLD CSR rating in
Year t+1, as compared to firms without CSR contracts. The dependent variable is CSR_ratingt+1. Columns 1 and 2
compare firms with Objective_contract and firms without any CSR contracts. Objective_contract takes a value of 1 if
the firm granted a Objective CSR contract in a given year, and 0 if the firm did not grant any CSR contracts (the base
category). Columns 3 and 4 compare firms with Subjective_contract and firms without any CSR contracts.
Subjective_contract takes a value of 1 if the firm granted an Subjective CSR contract in a given year, and 0 if the firm
did not grant any CSR contracts (the base category). We also control for CSR_ratingt in all specifications. We include
dummy variables for each of the six primary CSR-contracting variables (e.g. SHE_D takes a value of 1 if the firm
offered a CSR-contingent contract related to Safety, Health and Environment, 0 otherwise). Control variables include
all variables used in Table 6. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. Industry dummies are included in all regression
specifications, but the estimated coefficients are not reported for brevity. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
1

2

3

Intercept

-1.92***

-2.30***

-2.25***

CSR_ratingt

0.68***

0.66***

0.68***

Objective_contract

1.20***

Objective_contract×CSR_ratingt

-0.14***

Objective_contract×Earnings_volatility

-6.95***

Objective_contract×Firm_risk

-1.01***

Subjective_contract

4
-2.22***
0.67***

0.67***

Subjective_contract×CSR_ratingt

-0.03

Subjective_contract×Earnings_volatility

-1.86

Subjective_contract×Firm_risk

0.12

SHE_D

0.62***

0.31**

CSAT_D

0.47***

-0.00

ESAT_D

-0.45**

0.78***

-0.03

0.28**

Diversity_D
Sust_D

0.63***

Ethics_D

0.29**

0.06

0.42**

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Control Variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

1063

1063

1286

1286

0.59

0.59

0.59

0.59

2

R

Yes
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Table 9: CSR Ratings: Objective vs. Subjective CSR Contracts
This table below shows the results from estimating various executive-level specifications in which we assess how the
firm’s decision to grant an Objective CSR contract vs. a Subjective contract in Year t influences its subsequent KLD
CSR rating in Year t+1. The dependent variable is CSR_ratingt+1. Objective_contract takes a value of 1 if the
executive received an Objective CSR contract in a given year, and 0 if the executive received a Subjective CSR
contract. We exclude the firms that did not grant any CSR contracts. We also control for CSR_ratingt in all
specifications. We include dummy variables for each of the six primary CSR-contracting variables (e.g. SHE_D takes
a value of 1 if the firm offered a CSR-contingent contract related to Safety, Health and Environment, 0 otherwise).
Control variables include all variables used in Table 8. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. All firm-level variables
are measured at the end of preceding fiscal year. Industry dummies are included in all regression specifications, but
the estimated coefficients are not reported for brevity. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1% respectively.

1

2

3

4

5

Intercept

-2.43***

-2.46***

-2.54***

-4.60***

-4.43***

CSR_ratingt

0.61***

0.63***

0.64***

0.60***

0.61***

-0.06

0.09

0.65***

4.16***

4.44***

-0.07***

-0.12***

-0.05**

-0.10***

Objective_contract
Objective_contract×CSR_ratingt
Objective_contract×Earnings_volatility
Objective_contract×Firm_risk

-0.17

-1.57

-1.20***

-1.26***

Objective_contract×Board_independence

-1.90*

-1.72

Objective_contract×Board_diversity

-0.12***

-0.11***

Board_independence

1.52***

1.43**

Board_diversity

0.10***

0.10***

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Control Variables

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

3271

3271

3271

3271

3271

0.61

0.62

0.62

0.62

0.63

2

R

61
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Table 10: Robustness Tests
This table presents the results of the robustness tests. Panel A presents the results of the Granger causality tests applied
to the vector autoregression (VAR) residuals corresponding to CSR_contract and firm characteristics. Panel B uses
the generalized method of moments (GMM) to assess how the firm’s decision to grant a CSR contract in Year t
influences its subsequent KLD CSR rating in Year t+1. The dependent variable is CSR_ratingt+1.). Control variables
include all variables used in Table 6. Column1 follows Arellano and Bond (1991) to use a difference-GMM estimator
that takes the first difference of the regression equation and uses lagged levels of the variables as instruments for the
differenced variables. Column 2 follows Blundell and Bond (1998) to use a system-GMM estimator to simultaneously
estimate the equation in both differences and levels while using both sets of instruments. One- and two-year lags are
used. The reliability of the GMM estimates is checked using Hansen’s (1989) test for instrument validity and Arellano
and Bond’s (1991) test for serially uncorrelated error terms. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. Industry dummies
are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Granger Causality Tests
H0: Firm Variables Do Not
Cause CSR Contract
Firm Variables
Firm_size
Firm_risk
Tobin’s Q
ROA
Leverage
Earnings_volatility
Credit_rating
CSR_rating
Life_stage
Board_independence
Board_size
Classified_board
Board_cooption
Duality
Analyst_coverage
Industry_HHI
Institutional_ownership
Institutional_ownership_HHI

Chi-square
10.15
3.75
5.70
2.40
6.46
1.14
5.43
4.15
4.87
5.35
7.24
6.28
4.37
2.47
1.38
4.42
3.57
2.76

P-value
0.00
0.15
0.11
0.30
0.04
0.28
0.05
0.10
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.24
0.37
0.09
0.18
0.29

H0: CSR contract Do Not
Cause Firm Variables
Chi-square
0.56
1.86
3.13
1.04
2.89
0.16
1.59
7.73
0.72
0.13
1.80
4.99
3.29
4.17
2.01
3.30
0.62
2.36

P-value
0.75
0.40
0.21
0.60
0.24
0.87
0.45
0.04
0.71
0.93
0.44
0.17
0.20
0.55
0.32
0.27
0.73
0.31

Panel B: GMM
CSR_contract
Industry dummies
Control variables
N
Hansen J test p-value
AR(1) test p-value
AR(2) test p-value

Difference GMM
0.22***

System GMM
0.27***

Y
Y
856
0.25
0.00
0.18

Y
Y
856
0.31
0.00
0.22
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